This paper explores how the hypothetico-deductive method can be applied to research concerned with the properties of the language faculty by illustrating how it can be applied to the language-particular hypothesis that otagai in Japanese is a local anaphor. The paper adopts Chomsky's (1993) conception of the Computational System (hypothesized to be at the center of the language faculty) and considers informant judgments to be a major source of evidence for or against hypotheses about the Computational System. Given that informants' acceptability judgments can be affected by various non-grammatical factors, it is imperative, for the purpose of putting our hypotheses to rigorous test, that we have a reasonably reliable means to identify informant judgments as a likely reflection of properties of the Computational System (or properties of the language faculty that are directly related to the Computational System). The paper suggests a means to do so. I maintain that we are led to some version of it once we adopt the basic assumptions noted above, along with the research heuristic, explicitly advocated by K. Popper, that we should maximize our chances of learning from errors; cf. Popper 1963. The paper then examines, in accordance with the proposed method, the predictions made under the lexical hypothesis that otagai is a local anaphor and shows that the predictions are not borne out. If what underlies a local anaphor is closely related to "active functional categories" in the sense of Fukui 1986 and if, as suggested in Fukui 1986, the mental lexicon of speakers of Japanese lacks them altogether, this result is as expected.
Introduction
It is widely, and at one point almost universally, assumed in the recent generative grammatical works that otagai in Japanese is a reciprocal anaphor corresponding to English each other, and hence a local anaphor. The distribution of otagai and "its antecedent" has been addressed and used in various works as a probe into the nature of Scrambling, the applicability of Binding Theory to Japanese, the nature of reciprocity in natural language, the status of the subject(s) in Japanese, etc. 1 It is interesting to observe that this assumption-which is in fact a lexical hypothesis concerning otagai-has been accepted despite the demonstration that it cannot be upheld, at least since the late 1990s (see note 27 below). This state of affairs seems to be related to, if not due to, the fact that the field of generative 
a. α: presented sentence b. µ: numeration c. γ(a, b): the interpretation intended to be included in the 'meaning' of α involving expressions a and b 9 d. LF(µ): the LF representation that obtains on the basis of µ e. SR(µ): the information that obtains on the basis of LF(µ) f. PF(µ): the PF representation that obtains on the basis of µ g. pf(µ): the surface phonetic string that obtains on the basis of PF(µ) h. β: the informant judgment on the acceptability of α under γ(a, b) That a numeration is an input to the Computational System (CS) and its output representations are LF and PF is indicated by "==>" in (3). Similarly, the arrow between LF and SR and that between PF and pf indicate that SR obtains based on LF and pf obtains based on PF. What is intended by "≈≈>," on the other hand, is not an input/output relation; and "≈≈>" is used more loosely, as indicated in (4).
(4) a. Presented Sentence α ≈≈> Numeration Extractor: ... is part of the input to ... b. Numeration Extractor ≈≈> numeration µ: ... forms ... c. SR(µ) ≈≈> Judgment β: ... serves as a basis for ...
As discussed in some depth in Hoji 2009 , the model of judgment making in (3) is a consequence of adopting the theses, shared by most practitioners of generative grammar, that the Computational System in (2) is at the center of the language faculty and that informant judgments are a primary source of evidence for or against our hypotheses pertaining to properties of the Computational System.
Informant judgments and fundamental asymmetry
It seems reasonable to assume that the informant judgment β can be affected by the difficulty in comprehension. It may be well to emphasize, as Ayumi Ueyama points out, that the act of judgment making, more often than not, requires that informant do something that is not involved in ordinary language use. Such idealization in the context of experimentation is necessary in extracting 'information' pertaining to the properties of the Computational System from informant judgments, as I hope will be made clear in the ensuing discussion. I should add that it may be an interesting exercise to compare (3) with the model of comprehension discussed in Townsend and Bever 2001. 7 Hoji 2009: Appendix compares (3) with the model of judgment making suggested in Schütze 1996: 175. 8 Numeration Extractor (in place of Parser in the original Ueyama model) is due to Yuki Takubo (p.c., December 2009). 9 It is argued in Hoji 2009: chapter 5 that informant judgments would be qualitatively more difficult to handle if we dealt with simple (un)acceptability without involving γ(a, b) in regard to attributing the unacceptability in question to a property of the Computational System. parsing and the unnaturalness of the interpretation of the entire sentence in question. 10 That is to say, even if the informant (eventually) finds numeration µ corresponding to the presented sentence α such that µ results in pf(µ) non-distinct from α and SR(µ) compatible with the interpretation γ(a, b), that may not necessarily result in the informant reporting that α is (fully) acceptable under γ(a, b). On the other hand, if the informant fails to find such µ, the informant's judgment should necessarily be "total unacceptability" on α under γ(a, b) and that is precisely what is predicted when it is deduced from the hypotheses in question that there is no such numeration corresponding to sentence α. This is the source of the fundamental asymmetry between a *Schema-based prediction and an ok Schema-based prediction in terms of the significance of their failure (to be borne out); the asymmetry will play the most crucial conceptual basis of what will be presented in this paper; see below.
2.6. Empirical rigor, "facts," and confirmed schematic asymmetries Before proceeding further, I would like to turn to the following remarks by Feynman. 11 The history of the thing, briefly, is this. The ancients first observed the way the planets seemed to move in the sky and concluded that they all, along with the earth, went around the sun. This discovery was later made independently by Copernicus, after people had forgotten that it had already been made. Now the next question that came up for study was: exactly how do they go around the sun, that is, with exactly what kind of motion? Do they go with the sun as the centre of a circle, or do they go in some other kind of curve? How fast do they move? And so on. This discovery took longer to make. The times after Copernicus were times in which there were great debates about whether the planets in fact went around the sun along with the earth, or whether the earth was at the centre of the universe and so on. Then a man named Tycho Brahe evolved a way of answering the question. He thought that it might perhaps be a good idea to look very very carefully and to record exactly where the planets appear in the sky, and then the alternative theories might be distinguished from one another. This is the key of modern science and it was the beginning of the true understanding of Nature-this idea to look at the thing, to record the details, and to hope that in the information thus obtained might lie a clue to one or another theoretical interpretation. So Tycho, a rich man who owned an island near Copenhagen, outfitted his island with great brass circles and special observing positions, and recorded night after night the position of the planets. It is only through such hard work that we can find out anything.
When all these data were collected they came into the hands of Kepler, who then tried to analyse what kind motion the planets made around the sun. And he did this by a method of trial and error. At one state he thought he had it; he figured out that they went around the sun in circles with the sun off centre. Then Kepler noticed that one planet, I think it was Mars, was eight minutes of arc off, and he decided this was too big for Tycho Brahe to have made an error, and that this was not the right answer. So because of the precision of the experiments he was able to proceed to another trial and ultimately found out three things [i.e., Kepler's three laws of planetary motion, HH]." Feynman (1965/94; pp. 5-6)) Given that "[i]t is only through such hard work that we can find out anything," it is clear that we should bring the utmost rigor to our attempt to identify what the "facts" are. Without being able to identify what is a likely reflection of properties of the Computational System, neither could we specify the consequences of "our guess," nor could we compare them with the results of a "very carefully checked experiment." (See the Feynman remarks quoted at the outset of this paper.)
It is proposed in Hoji 2009 that what we can regard as a likely reflection of properties of the Computational System is a confirmed schematic asymmetry such that sentences conforming to one type of Schema are always judged to be totally unacceptable under a specified interpretation while those conforming to the other type of Schema are not necessarily judged to be totally unacceptable. The asymmetry follows from the considerations given in sections 2.2-2.4. In Hoji 2009, the former type of Schema is called a *Schema and sentences conforming to it are called *Examples; the latter type of Schema is called an ok Schema and sentences conforming to it are called ok Examples.
We can thus characterize a *Schema-based prediction and an ok Schema-based prediction as follows:
(5) A *Schema-based prediction:
The informant judgment on the presented sentence α under interpretation γ(a, b) is always "totally unacceptable" for any *Example conforming to a *Schema.
(6) An ok Schema-based prediction:
The informant judgment on the presented sentence α under interpretation γ(a, b) is not necessarily "totally unacceptable" for ok Examples conforming to an ok Schema.
There are two crucial points intended by schematic asymmetry. One is that the contrast of significance is not between examples but it is between Schemata. The other is that the contrast must be such that a *Schema-based prediction (see (5)) has survived a rigorous test of disconfirmation and furthermore it is accompanied by the confirmation of the corresponding ok Schema-based predictions. The formulation of a *Schema-based prediction in (5) is "definitive," so to speak. For an ok Schema-based prediction, on the other hand, there is a continuum of formulations from one extreme (as in (7)) to the other (as in (8)), with (6) falling between the two extremes.
(7) An ok Schema-based prediction-extreme version 1:
The informant judgment on the presented sentence α under interpretation γ(a, b) is not "totally unacceptable" for at least one ok Example conforming to an ok Schema.
(8) An ok Schema-based prediction-extreme version 2:
The informant judgment on the presented sentence α under interpretation γ(a, b) is "fully acceptable" for any ok Example conforming to an ok Schema.
The difference between the "definitive" formulation of a *Schema-based prediction in (5) and the continuum for the formulation of an ok Schema-based prediction is a reflection of the fundamental asymmetry between a *Schema-based prediction and an ok Schema-based prediction. Under the formulation of an ok Schema-based prediction as in (6) or (7)-taking the formulation of a *Schema-based prediction in (5) as 'invariant'-, we can state the fundamental asymmetry as follows: ok Schema-based predictions cannot be disconfirmed and they can only be confirmed; *Schema-based predictions, on the other hand, can be disconfirmed although they cannot be confirmed. The informant judgment that α is not totally unacceptable under γ(a, b) (even if not fully acceptable) would therefore disconfirm a *Schema-based prediction because that would mean, contrary to the prediction, that there is numeration µ corresponding to α that would result in LF(µ) (hence SR(µ)) compatible with γ(a, b) and PF(µ) (hence pf(µ)) non-distinct from α. While the marginal acceptability would thus disconfirm a *Schema-based prediction, it would be compatible with, and hence would confirm, an ok Schema-based prediction as formulated in (6) or (7).
If the ultimate testability of our hypotheses lies in their being subject to disconfirmation, it follows that what makes our hypotheses testable is the *Schema-based predictions they give rise to. To put it differently, it is by making *Schema-based predictions that we can seek to establish a "fact" that needs to be explained in research that is concerned with the properties of the Computational System and that serves as evidence for or against hypotheses about the Computational System.
Let us say that a predicted schematic asymmetry gets confirmed, i.e., a confirmed schematic asymmetry obtains iff the informants' judgments on *Examples are consistently "totally unacceptable" and their judgments on the corresponding ok Examples are not "totally unacceptable." By using the numerical values of "0" and "100" for "total unacceptability" and "full acceptability," respectively, we can more accurately express what we intend as follows: we say that a confirmed schematic asymmetry obtains iff the "representative value" of the *Schema is "0" and that of the corresponding ok Schemata is higher than "0." 12 On the basis of the considerations given above, I would like to maintain that confirmed schematic asymmetries are like "minimal units of facts" for research concerned with the properties of the Computational System.
The *Schema-based prediction in question must survive a rigorous test of disconfirmation while at the same time the corresponding ok Schema-based predictions must be confirmed; otherwise, the predicted schematic asymmetry does not get confirmed. If the predicted schematic asymmetry does not get confirmed, i.e., in the absence of a confirmed schematic asymmetry, the hypotheses that have resulted in the prediction of the schematic asymmetry should not be used in deducing further theoretical consequences or deriving further empirical predictions. That is one of the main methodological proposals advocated in Hoji 2009. 13 As noted above, while the requirement on the *Schema-based prediction is quite strict, how strict the requirement should be on an ok Schema-based prediction may depend on various factors. We surely cannot expect to be able to convince others if the "representative value" of the ok Schemata is "10," "20," or "30," for example, on the scale of "0" (for total unacceptability) to "100" (for full acceptability), even if the "representative value" of the corresponding *Schema is "0." While it is bound to be a subjective matter to determine what the "representative value" of the ok Schemata should be in order for a confirmed schematic asymmetry to obtain, the researchers themselves perhaps should aspire to the "standard" suggested in the formulation of an ok Schema-based prediction in (8), leaving aside its actual feasibility in every experiment. 14 Be that as it may, I maintain that identifying confirmed schematic asymmetries is analogous to the rigorous observation and recording of the positions of planets done by Tycho Brahe; see the Feynman remarks quoted above at the beginning of section 2.5. 15 Without confirmed schematic asymmetries, we would not have empirical bases for our research concerned with the Computational System of the language faculty.
The Significance of experimental results
Before turning to the discussion of empirical materials, I would like to make one last point in relation to the significance of experimental results. Suppose that we have designed and conducted an experiment to see if a predicted schematic asymmetry gets confirmed. Suppose that the *Schema-based prediction does not get disconfirmed and, furthermore, the corresponding ok Schema-based predictions get confirmed; see (5)-(8) and the discussion thereabout. Does that mean that we are justified to conclude that we now have a confirmed schematic asymmetry? Recall that a confirmed schematic 12 The "representative value" of a Schema is based on the informant judgments on the Examples that conform to the Schema; see Ueyama 2009 for more details. In actual practice, we must allow some room for the possibility of "errors" committed by informants. We might therefore have to be "content" with something like "5 or less" as the "representative value" of the *Schema, among the entire informants, on the scale of "0" (for total unacceptability) to "100" (for full acceptability), for example. It must be understood that, if some informants consistently find *Examples of a given *Schema more or less acceptable, that should be regarded as a serious challenge to the prediction in question even if the "representative value" of the *Schema among the entire informants is quite low. 13 The proposed method is called the Evaluation of Predicted Schematic Asymmetry (EPSA) method in Hoji 2009. 14 Hoji 2009 provides a great deal more discussion on the relevant issues, making reference to concepts such as informant's resourcefulness, single-informant experiments and multiple-informant experiments. 15 One may object that identifying confirmed schematic asymmetries is more "theory-driven" than the observation of the motion of the planets because the construction of a *Schema and the corresponding ok Schemata is based on hypotheses about properties of the Computational System, hypotheses (which are called bridging statements in Hoji 2009) about how a certain type of informant intuition arises only if a certain structural condition is met at LF, and hypotheses (which are called pf-LF correspondences in Hoji 2009)-presumably derived from more "basic" hypotheses-about what LF representation(s) a particular surface phonetic string can, cannot, or must correspond to, etc. It is, however, not entirely obvious that such an objection is well justified. After all, the accuracy of the observation of the planetary motions was enhanced (dramatically) by the introduction of various observation devices, including telescopes, and such devices and how to interpret what is "observed" by such devices are products of theories of various phenomena, including optics. asymmetry obtains iff the *Schema-based prediction has survived a rigorous disconfirmation attempt and at the same time the corresponding ok Schema-based predictions are confirmed. The fact that the result of a particular experiment is in harmony with the prediction therefore does not necessarily mean that we have obtained a confirmed schematic asymmetry. For it is possible that the experimental result thus obtained might be crucially due to the particular choice of the lexical items used in the Examples conforming to the Schemata in question. What is claimed by a *Schema-based prediction is that the informant judges any *Example (conforming to a *Schema) to be totally unacceptable under the specified interpretation. While the researcher might have tried his or her best to construct the *Examples that are most natural and the easiest to parse for the intended interpretation-as he or she in fact should-it is still possible that the researcher did not have enough ingenuity to construct *Examples conforming to the *Schema that are not totally unacceptable under the specified interpretation.
Once the predicted experimental results have obtained in his or her own experiment(s), the researcher should therefore invite other researchers to construct *Examples (as well as ok Examples) in accordance with the predicted schematic asymmetries and to conduct their own experiments. That is to say, having obtained the expected informant judgments in our own experiment(s) is merely a start in terms of our rigorous disconfirmation attempt. Other interested researchers are thus strongly encouraged to conduct experiments themselves on the basis of the predicted schematic asymmetries, and make various adjustments on the lexical items in the actual Examples conforming to the Schemata, doing the best they can to construct *Examples of the *Schema that are not totally unacceptable under the specified interpretation. The prediction is that the *Examples conforming to the *Schema are totally unacceptable under the specified interpretation no matter what efforts might be made to render the *Examples not totally unacceptable. If the *Schema-based prediction(s) did not get a value very close to zero in any of those experiment, such a result would constitute a serious challenge to our hypotheses; we must consider how such informant judgments arise. That should be our basic attitude if we are interested in discovering the properties of the Computational System of the language faculty in line with the general scientific method schematized in (1).
If the *Schema-based prediction does not get disconfirmed in many such experiments, we will finally be in a position to declare, with some confidence, that the *Schema-based prediction has survived a rigorous disconfirmation attempt, and to the extent that the corresponding ok Schema-based predictions get confirmed, we can say, again with some confidence, that we have indeed obtained a confirmed schematic asymmetry. 16
Otagai: an illustration

Hypotheses about local anaphors in English
It has been observed at least since the mid 1960s that the informants' judgments on sentences like (9) are in accord with the general pattern as indicated below.
(9) a. John recommended himself.
b. *John thought that Mary had recommended himself.
Attempts have been made to express the contrast as a reflection of the Computational System, resulting in a hypothesis about the Computational System that has the effect in (10) and a hypothesis about the mental Lexicon of speakers of English as in (11), as discussed in Chomsky 1981. 16 The research attitude advocated here is thus quite different from one that takes the presence of some contrast between some examples for some speakers in the predicted direction as evidence in support of the hypotheses that give rise to the prediction under discussion. As argued above, the mere fact that such a contrast obtains between some examples for some speakers does not mean much for research concerned with the properties of the Computational System in line with the general scientific method schematized in (1). I might add in passing that if a *Schema does not specify anything about prosody or intonation, the claim must be that *Examples conforming to the *Schema is totally unacceptable no matter what prosody/intonation might be used; cf. Miyagawa and Arikawa 2007 : 652 (at the end of their section 3) for a remark that seems to be based on a rather different view.
(10) A [+A] category must have an "antecedent" in its local domain.
(11) Himself is marked [+A] in the mental Lexicon of speakers of English.
By defining "local domain" so as to ensure that in (12) NP2 is, but NP1 is not, in the local domain of NP3, the contrast in (9) is accounted for. 17
That is to say, if one puts forth or accepts a hypothesis that expression α is marked [+A], one can make a testable prediction-as long as one also accepts something like (10) and the definition of "local domain" that has the effect noted above. One of the clearest predictions is that sentences containing α are unacceptable if α is an embedded object and is interpreted as sharing the same value as the matrix subject. We can state the predicted schematic asymmetry as follows:
As suggested above, what is predicted is a schematic asymmetry. More specifically, the prediction is that there are no Examples conforming to (13b) that are judged not totally unacceptable while there are Examples conforming to (13a) and (13c) that are judged (more or less) acceptable under the interpretations indicated in (13a) and (13c). We are not going to address here how robust the informant judgments are on the relevant examples; we only note here that an informal survey conducted a few years ago suggests that they are fairly robust and they are in accordance with (13). 18
Hypotheses about local anaphors in Japanese
Hypotheses
In much of the generative research over the past 20 years, Japanese expressions such as otagai, zibun-zisin, and kare-zisin have been assumed to be marked [+A] in the sense noted in the preceding subsection, and they have been called local anaphors in Japanese. Many generative works dealing with Japanese have provided some paradigm or other in support of such hypotheses and other works have derived and discussed various empirical as well as theoretical consequences by assuming the validity of the lexical hypotheses under discussion. 19 The claim that otagai, zibun-zisin, and kare-zisin are local 17 The use of "NP" in place of "DP" here and elsewhere is inconsequential for the issues addressed in this paper.. 18 See Appendix for a summary of the informal survey. 19 Such works are in fact numerous and they include Katada 1991 , Nishigauchi 1992 , Saito 1992 , and Takita 2009 anaphors can be stated as in (14); see (11). 20 (14) Specifications in the mental Lexicon of speakers of Japanese:
The properties of the Computational System are assumed to be universal, with the possible exception of the so-called head parameter. The hypothesis that has the effect in (10), repeated here, is considered as being part of the Computational System or is closely related to it, and it is considered universal.
(10)
A [+A] category must have an "antecedent" in its local domain.
A natural application to Japanese of the notion of "local domain" as understood in relation to (12) would lead us to accept that in (15) NP2 is, but NP1 is not, in the local domain of NP3.
With the language-specific lexical hypotheses in (14) and the universal hypothesis in (10), along with the articulation of "local domains" in Japanese just given, we make testable predictions. We turn to some of them in the following subsection, dealing only with otagai. 21
*Schema-based predictions and ok Schema-based predictions
The predicted schematic asymmetries as indicated in (16) and (17) are among the consequences of adopting (10), (14a), and the characterization of the "local domain" as noted above. The predictions are thus as follows:
(22) The *Schema-based prediction:
The *Examples conforming to the *Schemata in (16b) and (17b) 
Experiments and results
One can test a *Schema-based prediction and corresponding ok Schema-based predictions by checking informant judgments on *Examples and the corresponding ok Examples, to see if we obtain a confirmed schematic asymmetry. Here, I would like to briefly introduce the general design of experiments that we have been conducting. 22 The examples are presented on-line to the informants, along with the specification of their intended interpretations. The specifications of the intended interpretations are as in (24), for example, once translated into English.
(24) a. under the interpretation that "John voted for Bill and Bill voted for John"
b. under the interpretation that karera 'them' and John to Bill 'John and Bill' refer to the same individuals
In an experiment on the predicted schematic asymmetries in (16) and (17), for example, the 12 Examples in (18)-(21) are presented to informants in a random fashion, (i) one at a time or (ii) three at a time (e.g., those in (18)), depending upon the test type chosen by each informant.
Depending upon the chosen test type, the informants either (i) choose "No" (for "not acceptable no matter what") or "Yes" (for "(more or less) acceptable") or (ii) indicate how acceptable they find each example by clicking one of the five radio buttons as in (25) What the informant has indicated is converted to numerical values as in (26), i.e., the worst score is converted to "0" and the best score to "100." Likewise, the "Yes" or the "No" answer in the "Yes-or-No" test gets converted to "0" or "100," respectively, although the informants are not informed how their judgments get converted to numerical values. The informants are allowed to return to the experiment website and report their judgments in the same experiment again, and in fact as many times as they wish; they may repeat the same "test type" as before or choose a different "test type" (as to "Yes-or-No" or "Five-ranking" and also as to "one at a time," "three at a time" (or "all in one sheet" in some cases)). In the event that one informant has reported his/her judgment on the same experiment more than once, regardless of the "test type," that informant's average score on a given example is used when calculating the average score on that example for the entire informants in the experiment. The results we have obtained so far indicate that the choice of the "test type" does not make a significant difference.
The *Schema-based predictions under the lexical hypothesis in (14a)-that otagai is marked
[+A]-are clearly disconfirmed. Provided in (27) is a summary (as of January 30, 2010) of the results of the experiment on the predicted schematic asymmetry in (16) and (17). (27) Otagai is in the embedded object position. (20a) and (21a), "Schema 1 B" the * Examples in (20b) and (21b), and "Schema 1 C" the ok Examples in (20c) and (21c). "655 answers" means that there have been 655 occurrences of a reported judgment. As noted, some informants have judged the same example more than once; but in such cases the values in (27) are based on the average score on a given example by the same informant. The values of "Schema 1 B" and "Schema 2 B" should be close to "0" according to the predicted schematic asymmetries in (16) and (17). The informant judgments as indicated in (27) thus clearly disconfirm the *Schema-based predictions based on the lexical hypothesis in (14a).
It may be possible that someone can in the future come up with a way to modify and hence save a version of the lexical hypothesis in (14a), and those in (14b) and (14c); see footnote 23. Several attempts are in fact discussed in Hoji 2009 and it is concluded there that such attempts either end up being content-reducing (or degenerating) problemshift in the terms of Lakatos 1979 only in the elimination of the *Schema-based prediction without introducing a new *Schema-based prediction-or simply fail to save the hypotheses under discussion. I leave the challenge of saving those hypotheses in a theoretically progressive way to those who wish to make use of them in their theoretical discussion.
Fukui's (1986) thesis and the absence of local anaphors in Japanese
While it is not possible to empirically demonstrate the non-existence of elements in Japanese that are marked [+A]-for it is not possible to empirically demonstrate the non-existence of anything-their non-existence in Japanese is an immediate consequence if we adopt the thesis put forth in Fukui 1986 (and also in Kuroda 1988 under its reinterpretation in Hoji 1996c). Fukui (1986) proposes that the mental Lexicon of speakers of Japanese does not contain what is responsible for making functional categories "active." Given the assumption that what most crucially underlies a local anaphor is an "active functional category"-cf. Lebeaux 1983 and Chomsky 1986 : 175f-it follows that Japanese does not have local anaphors. Given this, the results of the experiments reported above are just as expected. That is to say, the fact that the researchers have so far failed to identify what qualifies as a local anaphor in Japanese despite the concerted efforts by a substantial number of practitioners for nearly three decades, is not puzzling, after all. 23
Concluding remarks
This paper started out by considering the basic scientific method, what Feynman calls "the key to science," as schematized in (1), repeated here.
(28)
The general scientific method (i.e., the hypothetic-deductive method): Guess -Computing Consequences -Compare with Experiment
After pointing out what informant judgments can reasonably be considered as a reflection of properties of the Computational System, I adopted, with slight modification, Ueyama's model of judgment making, and proceeded to examine predictions made under the lexical hypotheses in (14a), also repeated here.
(14) Specifications in the mental Lexicon of speakers of Japanese:
The hypotheses in (14), combined with the universal hypothesis in (10), along with the articulation of "local domains" in Japanese noted above, make definite and testable predictions.
As we have observed in section 4, the *Schema-based predictions under (14a) are clearly disconfirmed. 24 I have also noted that this result is in fact as expected. If what underlies a local anaphor is closely related to an "active functional category" in the sense of Fukui 1986 , and if the mental Lexicon of speakers of Japanese lacks "active functional categories" altogether, as suggested in Fukui 1986 , the absence of local anaphors in Japanese is exactly what we expect. 25 Recall that the mere presence of some contrast among some Examples (for some speakers) as predicted by the hypotheses in question does not constitute sufficient ground for a confirmed schematic asymmetry. Given the fundamental asymmetry between a *Schema-based prediction and an ok Schema-based prediction, what needs to be demonstrated is that the former survives a rigorous disconfirmation attempt and at the same time the latter gets confirmed. Thus, even if there were some speakers who detected a significant contrast among some relevant Examples in question, that in and by made under those hypotheses have also been disconfirmed.
As H.-D. Ahn (p.c., 12/12/2009) suggests, one might pursue the possibility that the hypotheses in (14) are valid but that otagai, zibun-zisin and kare-zisin always occur in a structural position in which they have a covert "antecedent" in its local domain. While such a move does save (14) from refutation (and one might even claim that it allows us to maintain the thesis that Japanese shares a "universal property" of having [+A] elements), it results in the elimination of the *Schema-based predictions. Hence that would be a content-reducing (or degenerating) problemshift in the sense of Lakatos 1970 . Furthermore, if we accepted the view that what formally underlies a local anaphor is something like an "active functional category," it would be puzzling that there does not seem to be any confirmed schematic asymmetry in support of the presence of an "active functional category" in Japanese. (I am not aware of any empirical evidence in support of the existence of DPs in Japanese and of the EPP (feature) in Japanese that forms a confirmed schematic asymmetry in accordance with the EPSA method advocated here.)
We should also add that being able to save them from refutation would not justify one's use of (14) in making further empirical predictions, in relation to "reconstruction effects" in "scrambling" (i.e., in OSV), for example, because we have not yet obtained any confirmed schematic asymmetry in support of (14) in the simplest paradigm involving SOV. Using (14) in making further empirical predictions would go against the research heuristic, explicitly advocated by K. Popper (cf. Popper 1963) , that we should maximize our chances of learning from errors. itself would not mean much; it must be demonstrated that the informants judge any *Example conforming to the *Schema totally unacceptable while at the same time judging ok Examples of the corresponding ok Schema significantly more acceptable. Although one might wonder if that might be too high a standard for actual research because we perhaps cannot fully control various non-grammatical factor, I should like to mention that it is in fact possible to obtain a confirmed schematic asymmetry in accordance with the above-mentioned standard. In experiments on bound variable anaphora and the local disjointness effects of Binding Principle B, the "representative values" of the *Schemata are lower than "5" (and quite close to "0") in the "0-100" scale while those of the corresponding ok Schemata are well over "90." The results of such experiments, for which I must refer the readers to (a revised version of) Hoji 2009, thus indicate clearly that the "high standard" is in fact attainable. 26 In line with the point made in section 2.7, obtaining the expected informant judgments is merely a start in terms of our rigorous disconfirmation attempt. That is to say, other interested researchers should conduct experiments themselves on the basis of the predicted schematic asymmetries, making various adjustments on the lexical items in the actual Examples conforming to the Schemata; as noted above, they should do the best they can to construct *Examples of the *Schema that are not totally unacceptable under the specified interpretation. The prediction is that the *Examples of the *Schema will still be totally unacceptable under the specified interpretation despite such efforts.
It is in light of the above that we must appreciate the significance of the experimental results reported above, which clearly invalidate the lexical hypothesis in (14a). While I would be quite surprised if the *Schema-based predictions under the lexical hypotheses in (14a) did not get disconfirmed in other "instantiations" of the same experimental design, what is crucial is not whether we might actually obtain experimental results that would be in harmony with the predicted schematic asymmetries in accordance with the lexical hypotheses in (14a). Even if we obtained results in harmony with the predicted schematic asymmetries in some experiments, that would not be nearly as significant as there being a result of an experiment that disconfirms the *Schema-based predictions under the lexical hypotheses in (14a), for the reasons adduced in the preceding discussion.
Appendix: An analysis of otagai 27
Introduction
Given the conclusion reached above that otagai is not a local anaphor, one might ask what it might be. In this Appendix, I will point out that the observations about otagai that can be summarized in (29)-some of which have already been discussed above-are consistent with the proposals in (30) although puzzling under the hypothesis that otagai is a local anaphor. One might wonder why the hypothesis that has been falsified quite clearly and blatantly has continued to be used in a crucial way in many of the works even up to the present time. The reason, I believe, has to do with the lack of understanding on the part of many practitioners of the significance of negative predictions and falsification in linguistic science, which is addressed to some extent, but admittedly insufficiently in Hoji 2003. 28 It should be noted that otagai in many of the examples to be supplied below appears in an "argument position" where, according to Pollard and Sag 1992, "exempt anaphors" are not allowed. For many of the examples with (29) a. The "antecedent" of otagai need not be in the local domain of the latter. b. The "antecedent" of otagai need not c-command the latter as long as the relevant anaphoric relation is that of coreference. c. Otagai need not have an antecedent. d. Split antecedence is possible for otagai. e. Familiar Weak Crossover (WCO) effects are observed when the "antecedent" of otagai is "quantificational" and hence bound variable anaphora is at stake.
(30) Proposals a. The internal structure of otagai is [ NP pro [ N otagai]] 29 b. What has been considered as the anaphoric relation between otagai and "its antecedent" must be understood as that between the pro in [ NP pro [ N otagai]] and the "antecedent" of pro.
Under the proposals in (30), the observations in (29) can be restated as in (31) In section 7.2, I will first point out that the reciprocal reading is not the only reading for otagai and it is perhaps not the primary reading, judging from the definitions found in major dictionaries. In section 7.3, I will illustrate the relevant observations in (29), restated in (31). I will address the postulation of pro in [ NP pro [ N otagai]] in section 7.4 by making reference to the absence of Principle B effects.
Non-reciprocal readings of otagai
Before we start the main discussion, I would like to make some remarks regarding the reciprocal interpretation associated with otagai. Despite the common assumption made in the generative works, the reciprocal interpretation is not obligatory for otagai. 30 Consider (32), for example. "exempt anaphors" provided in Pollard and Sag 1992, we can construct analogous Japanese examples with otagai. Some of the examples with otagai, however, do not have their each other analogues; see for example the split antecedence cases in section 7.3.4. In this paper, I will not discuss in any depth the distributional similarities and differences between "exempt anaphors" of Pollard and Sag (1992) and otagai (i.e. [pro [otagai] ]), or whether and how the distributional properties that they share can be characterized in a principled manner. 29 By pro I mean a phonetically empty argument, leaving aside the questions in (i) in this paper. whether it has the binding-theoretic [+pronominal] feature. The proposed structure [ NP pro [ N otagai]] can be translated in terms of the DP analysis of the Japanese nominal phrases, without any consequences, as far as the materials in this paper are concerned. But see Hoji 1995, where it is argued that the empty argument is [ N(P) ec] and that it does not have the binding-theoretic [+pronominal] feature. 30 In fact, the typical dictionary definitions of otagai do not make reference to reciprocity. There are no entries for otagai in the Sanseido Japanese Language Dictionary 4th Edition (1972 ) or Koozien (1955 . Otagai is formed by attaching the prefix o to tagai and the meaning and the distribution of otagai and tagai are quite similar, although not completely identical. In fact, otagai is used in example sentences under the entry of tagai. It thus seems safe to assume that the dictionary definitions of tagai are meant to cover otagai as well.)
As the definitions for tagai, the Sanseido Japanese Language Dictionary 4th Edition (1972, p. 770) gives (i) In what follows, the nature of the reciprocal interpretation associated with otagai and how it arises will not be addressed. I will only be concerned with the (allegedly) necessary structural relations between otagai, more precisely pro in [pro [otagai] ], and its "antecedent."
Observations
In this section, the five observations recorded in (29) will be illustrated and will be shown to be compatible with the proposals in (30).
Locality
That otagai need not have its "antecedent" in its local domain is illustrated by examples like (36), representing otagai in accordance with (30); see section 3.2.2. 31
(i)
Each individual (each thing) that has a relationship (to that which is under discussion). (In many cases it refers to two people (things).) (This is my translation of (Sore-ni) kankei-o motu hitori hitori (hitotu hitotu). (Hutari (hutatu no monogoto) 
nituite yuu bawai-ga ooi).) (ii)
A situation/manner in which the same holds, in some respect, of the two (or more) people (or things) that are related. (This is my translation of Kankei aru hutari (izyoo) no monogoto-ga aru ten-de onazi de aru yoosu.) Koozien (1955 Koozien ( , p. 1355 
gives (iii) and (iv). (iii)
Both of the two opposing parties. In particular, both oneself and the other. (This is my translation of Aitaisuru hutatu no mono no soohoo. Tokuni zibun to aite to.) (iv)
The state in which both parties are the same. (This is my translation of Soohoo-ga dooyoo-de aru koto.) 31 We can make one or the other "reading" more salient. Suppose John and Bill hate each other and they are both in love with Mary. Uttered in such a context, the strongly preferred "reading" is the "parallel reading" for (i-a) and the "crossing reading" for (i-b 
C-command
Examples like (37) show that the "antecedent" of otagai (and of pro in [pro [otagai ] ] under (30)) need not c-command otagai (and hence pro in [pro [otagai ] ] under (30)) as long as the relevant anaphoric relation is that of coreference, as is independently pointed out in Kuno and Kim 1994 . 'John's lover tried to seduce Bill, and Bill's lover tried to seduce John.'
Without an antecedent
In examples like (38), there is no "antecedent" for otagai, at least in any obvious way.
(38) a. Haru-no atatakana kaze-ga otagai-o totemo siawasena kimoti-ni sita. 'If otagai (=both of them) are satisfied, I will not raise issues.'
If otagai is analyzed as [pro [otagai] ], the acceptability of examples like (38) is not particularly surprising; they are instances of the referential use of pro. Without an antecedent, the interpretation for otagai in examples like (38) is that of a "group reading."
Split antecedence
Split antecedence is possible for otagai, as illustrated in (39) As in the case of (38), the relevant interpretation for otagai is that of a "group reading." Split antecedence is not limited to cases of coreference, as indicated in (40) The relevant reading in (40a), for example, is that for each feudal king in Kyusyu x there is a feudal king of some place in Shikoku y such that x told y that if Shingen dies x and y's territories will be safe for a while. This is an instance of so-called split-binding; see Lasnik 1989 , Appendix. The split-antecedence possibility is compatible with the proposals in (30), as indicated with the use of pro in (39) and (40); but it would be puzzling if otagai were a local reciprocal anaphor on a par with English each other.
Weak Crossover effects
According to the proposals in (30), the relevant relation in sentences with otagai is between pro in [pro [otagai]] and the "antecedent" of pro. In section 7.3.2 we have seen that pro in [pro [otagai] ] (hence otagai) need not be c-commanded by its "antecedent" if the relevant relation is that of '(I saw) [a good number of Japanese couples] 1 harshly criticize their 1 (former) teachers].'
The relevant reading is that it is true for a good number of Japanese couples that, for each couple, I saw the husband x and the wife y harshly criticize the former teachers of x and y. Confining ourselves to such readings, the embedded clause of (41) can be understood as corresponding to any of (42).
(42) For a good number of couples, it is true of each of the couples that a. the husband x and the wife y harshly criticized x and y's shared teacher(s) of the past b. the husband x harshly criticized the wife y's former teacher(s), and the wife y harshly criticized the husband x's former teacher(s) c. the husband x harshly criticized x's former teacher(s), and the wife y harshly criticized y's former teacher(s)
Given that the relevant readings here are instances of bound variable anaphora, we predict that they become unavailable in a typical Weak Crossover configuration. Such indeed seems to be the case. The embedded clause of (43) seems to fail to yield the interpretation corresponding to (44). 32
(44) For a good number of couples, it is true of each of the couples that a. [the husband x and the wife y ]'s shared teacher(s) harshly criticized x and y b. the husband x's former teacher(s) harshly criticized the wife y and the wife y 's former teacher(s) harshly criticized the husband x's former teacher(s) c. the husband x's former teacher(s) harshly criticized x and the wife y 's former teacher(s) harshly criticized y
As we have seen earlier, if coreference, rather than bound variable anaphora, is at stake, the c-command is not a necessary condition for the relevant reading to obtain. The same point is illustrated below. '(I saw) their 1 (former) teachers harshly criticize [that Japanese couple] 1 .'
Recall that split antecedence is possible between pro in [pro [otagai] ] and its "antecedents." In section 7.3.4, we have seen an instance of 'split coreference' and an instance of 'split binding', so to speak. Along the lines of the preceding discussion in this section, we predict that 'split coreference' continues to be possible even when pro in [pro [otagai] ] is not c-commanded by its "antecedents" but 'split binding' becomes unavailable if the relevant c-command relation fails to obtain. These predictions also seem to be borne out, as the following examples indicate. 33 (46) [ '(the fact that the way in which) their 1+2 new coach introduced to every male student 1 some female student 2 (was strange has become a hot topic of conversation all over the school)' 34
It is argued in Hoji 1998 that the comparative ellipsis construction in Japanese (sometimes called 33 In accordance with the EPSA method proposed in the main text above, one may want to conduct experiments to see whether the *Schema-based predictions as indicated in (43) and (48) survive a rigorous disconfirmation attempt; see, however, the remark at the end of section 7.5. 34 The English translation here is meant to remind the reader that the ni-marked argument c-commands the o-marked argument in (46) Note that in (49) pro in [pro [otagai] ] is c-commanded by [Mike to Sam] . Given the assumption that the availability of the sloppy identity readings is subject to the same c-command condition as that of bound variable anaphora, 36 the absence of the sloppy reading in (51) 36 This assumption, while it seems more or less standard, is not uncontroversial. Fiengo and May (1994) , for example, argue against it; see also Hoji 1996a Hoji , 1996b and the references there as well as the references in Fiengo and May 1994. 37 For concreteness, I assume, as in Hoji 1998, that John to Bill-ni yori 'than John and Bill' in (49) and (51) As in the case of the *Schema-based predictions in the preceding two subsections, the *Schema-based prediction as indicated above has not been tested by the EPSA method yet.
On the Postulation of pro in [pro [otagai]] 7.4.1. Binding Principle B Effects
We have observed that the empirical materials presented above are compatible with the proposals (30); but they are also compatible with an alternative analysis of otagai, according to which otagai itself is a pronominal instead of having an internal structure as indicated in (30a). Under such an analysis, we would expect otagai to have all the properties discussed in the preceding section: it does not require its "antecedent" to be in its local domain, or in a position c-commanding it; it can appear with an antecedent, it allows split antecedence; but the failure of the c-command makes split binding, although not in that of split coreference.
One may argue that examples like (32), repeated below now without pro, would be incorrectly ruled out under such an analysis because Principle B of Binding Theory would be violated, and may take that as support for the proposal in (30) It is argued in Hoji 1995 that we do observe Principle B effects even in Japanese when bound variable anaphora is at stake. The argument is based on the alleged contrast as indicated in (57) and (58). 39 38 If otagai is treated as a pronominal, (i) may be a structurally more accurate translation of (32). (i) [John and Bill] 1 were promoting them 1 with utmost enthusiasm. 39 In subsequent research (e.g., Hoji 2003 and , it is pointed out that the unacceptability of examples like (57) is not as robust as predicted but that more robust unacceptability judgments obtain if the object NP appears before the subject NP in examples like (57). We can strengthen the empirical basis for the argument here concerning (57)-(59) by considering the OSV version of those examples. In this paper, I suppress the complications involved and illustrate the point by means of (57)-(59), to simplify the discussion. Crucially, the bound variable readings, i.e. the distributive readings, seem possible here. For example, it seems that (59a) can have an interpretation corresponding to (60); and (59b) to (61). 40 (60) It is true of that Japanese couple as well as of this American couple that a. the husband x and the wife y were promoting x and y b. the husband x was promoting the wife y, and y was promoting x. c. the husband x was promoting x, and the wife y was promoting y (61)
For a good number of couples, it is true of each of those couples that a. the husband x and the wife y were promoting x and y b. the husband x was promoting the wife y, and y was promoting x. c. the husband x was promoting x, and the wife y was promoting y If Principle B effects are observed when bound variable anaphora is at stake, and if otagai were a pronominal, being subject to Principle B, the bound readings should be unavailable in (59) on a par with (57); see note 39. The availability of the bound readings in (59) thus argues against treating otagai itself as a pronominal although such a view is consistent with the observations made in section 7.3. If what is "bound" by the quantificational subject in (59) is not otagai itself but pro in [pro [otagai] ], as suggested in (30), the binding is not local, and hence the absence of Principle B effects is in (59) is as expected.
Parallelism between otagai and kinship terms
Given the conclusion reached in the main text, one might wonder how one is to understand the empirical bases put forth in the literature in support of the hypothesis that otagai is a local anaphor. This subsection addresses this question. It will be observed that the relevant patterns of judgments on examples with otagai also seem to obtain for examples with a kinship term in place of otagai. To the extent that a kinship term such as titioya 'father' is represented as [pro [ titioya] ], the empirical materials to be presented below are also compatible with the [pro [otagai]] analysis of otagai in (30).
The contrast in (62), in particular the status of examples like (62b), has been taken as evidence that otagai must be c-commanded by its "antecedent" (or more precisely, must be A-bound). 41 (62) a. (Saito's (1992) (12b) 'Each other's 1 teachers criticized them 1 '
The claim that the "antecedent" of otagai must be in the local domain of the latter has been based on the alleged status of examples like (63).
b. [pro 1 titioya]-no koibito-ga John 1 -ni iiyotta (koto) 'his 1 father's lover tried to seduce John 1 '
It thus seems that whatever is wrong with (68) is wrong with (69) as well. 42 The examples in (71) As indicated, the examples in (72) seem to have the same status as (71). Given the view that the degraded status of (68) and (71) is due to some non-syntactic factors, we expect that we can construct more or less acceptable examples that are of the same structures as (68) and (71), by an appropriate choice of lexical items. This is precisely what seems to happen, as indicated by the examples in (73). The strong parallelism observed between the otagai examples and their kinship-term analogues leads us to expect that we can make more or less acceptable examples with a kinship term, just as we have been able to construct more or less acceptable examples with otagai such as (73). Such is indeed 42 If the anaphoric relation in (i) is difficult to obtain for some speakers, the one in (ii), I expect, is equally difficult to obtain for the same speakers. (i)
[pro 1 otagai]-no sensei-ga [John to Bill] 1 -o hihansita (koto) 'their 1 teachers criticized [John and Bill] 1 ' (ii)
[pro 1 titioya]-no sensei-ga John 1 -o hihansita (koto) 'his 1 father's teacher criticized John 1 ' Many speakers including this author find both (i) and (ii) (and in fact (62b) as well) to be acceptable with the relevant anaphoric relation. analyzed either as [ NP pro [ N otagai]] or as a local anaphor. Although the empirical materials discussed above are compatible with such an analysis, we must recognize that there is no syntactic environment in which the local anaphor otagai can appear but [ NP pro [ N otagai]] cannot. Such an analysis therefore is not testable, making the proposed move content-reducing or empirically degenerating in the terms of Lakatos 1979 ; see note 23.
One may wonder whether the analysis of otagai suggested in (30) gives rise to a confirmed schematic asymmetry in the terms of the text discussion above. Since we have not conducted relevant experiments, we do not have the answer to the question. However, to the extent that the anaphoric relation involves the so-called null argument (represented above as pro), there would be an additional complication in obtaining a confirmed schematic asymmetry, as discussed in Hoji 2003: 2.2.2, and we would not be surprised if we did not obtain a confirmed schematic asymmetry as clearly and robustly with otagai as we do with bound variable anaphora involving a "singular-denoting" dependent term.
